Journal • Your goal is to write 3-4 paragraphs of 4-5 sentences each about the t

Journal
• Your goal is to write 3-4 paragraphs of 4-5 sentences each about the top three points/issues you learned about during the previous two weeks.
• You should put an emphasis in your blog on what was your top takeaway from the previous two weeks’ topics.
Week 3 Lecture Notes
• Chapter 3 Lowenthal
• Hendrix Chapter 1
• Week 3 Lecture Notes and review the websites linked to it.
• Executive Order 12333 (Amended) & Factsheet (found online on BB)
• National Security Act of 1947 (Amended) (found online on BB)
• Intelligence Reform & Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Amended) (found online on BB)
Why? The war, World War Two that is, had been won. The hundreds of thousands of American troops deployed overseas were coming home. Americans were celebrating victory and mourning the loss of hundreds of thousands of dead and even more wounded servicemen. Our nation was retooling a war-based economy to peacetime one. But a new threat, and one more powerful than the Axis was looming—the USSR aka the Soviet Union. What made it so powerful? Their own atomic and soon to be thermonuclear weapons—thanks in many ways to the secrets they stole from the Manhattan Project—see allies do spy on each other! Senior US leadership were slow to warm to this threat during the war—the USSR was our ally and did more than its fair share of destroying the Nazi war machine, and US leaders did not want anything to detract from its contributions. But as the war was coming to its conclusion, more and more signs that the Soviets were to be a larger threat emerged. Thanks to George Kennan’s 1946 Long Telegram (the Deputy Chief of the US Mission to the USSR and probably the US’ first real Soviet expert) and postwar experiences (Soviet domination of eastern Europe and eastern Germany, support to anti-democratic movements in Turkey and Greece, etc.), senior US leadership were coming more and more concerned with the Soviet threat. The strategy of containment, not all-out war, was devised to deal with the Soviets. Aiding in the development of the containment strategy was the publishing of the Long Telegram as an article in the Foreign Affairs Journal by “X” in 1947— “X” was later revealed to be George Kennan. Ultimately, Kennan’s thinking heavily influenced the publishing of NSC 68 in 1950, which laid out the strategic plans of the US on countering the worldwide threat of communism. Added to this morass of postwar diplomacy and international security was the question, “how does the US avoid sneak attacks on itself like Pearl Harbor in the future?” A major catalyst was the goal of not to have an intelligence failure like Pearl Harbor take place again.1 As part of this national security debate, President Truman and Congress recognized that a strong intelligence function was needed but not one dominated by the military. Which by the way, was also struggling with creating its postwar structure particularly how to incorporate airpower (can anyone say independent Air Force?) and atomic weapons. 1 If you are interested in the intelligence failure that contributed to the Pearl Harbor disaster, I highly recommend reading Roberta Wohlstetter’s Pearl Harbor; Warning & Decision. 2 President Truman had some strong opinions regarding the formation of the intel community, and moreover, the creation of a better form of the OSS: “…he had in mind a different kind of intelligence service from what the country had in the past.” Truman had a simple vision for the output he desired from the IC, “It was to keep him personally well-informed of all that was going on in the outside world.”2 Feeding into this debate was the July 1946 report of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. This report published a number of recommendations and suggestions regarding the role of intelligence. Those recommendations follow: • Operational and intelligence work requires centralization of authority and clear-cut allocation of responsibility. • Supervisory officials cannot safely take anything for granted in the alerting of subordinates. • Any doubt as to whether outposts should be given information should always be resolved in favor of supplying the information. • The delegation of authority or the issuance of order’s entails the duty of inspection to determine that the official mandate is properly exercised. • The implementation of official orders must be followed with closest supervision. • The maintenance of alertness to responsibility must be insured through repetition. • Complacency and procrastination are out of place where sudden and decisive actions are of the essence. • The coordination and proper evaluation of intelligence in times of stress must be insured by continuity of service and centralization of responsibility in competent officials. • The unapproachable or superior attitude of officials is fatal: There should never be any hesitancy in asking for clarification of instructions or in seeking advice on matters that are in doubt. • There is no substitute for imagination and resourcefulness on the part of supervisory and intelligence officials. • Communications must be characterized by clarity, forthrightness, and appropriateness. • There is great danger in careless paraphrase of information received and every effort should be made to ensure that the paraphrased material reflects the true meaning of the original. • Procedures must be sufficiently flexible to meet the exigencies of unusual situations. 2 Turner, Stansfield, Burn Before Reading; Presidents, CIA Directors, and Secret Intelligence, New York, NY: Hyperion, 2005, pg 40. 3 • Restriction of highly confidential information to a minimum number of officials, while often necessary, should not be carried to the point of prejudicing the work of the organization • There is great danger of being blinded by the self-evident. • Officials should at all times give subordinates the benefit of significant information. • An official who neglects to familiarize himself in detail with his organization should forfeit his responsibility. • Failure can be avoided in the long run only by preparation for any eventuality. • Officials, on a personal basis, should never countermand an official instruction. • Personal or official jealousy will wreck any organization. • Personal friendship, without more, should never be accepted in lieu of liaison or confused therewith where the latter is necessary to the proper functioning of two or more agencies. • No considerations should be permitted as excuse for failure to perform a fundamental task. • Superiors must at all times keep their subordinates adequately informed and, conversely, subordinates should keep their superiors informed • The administrative organization of any establishment must be designed to locate failures and to assess responsibility. • In a well-balanced organization there is close correlation of responsibility and authority. In my estimation, many of their recommendations remain germane to today’s intelligence operations and administration. In 1945, President Truman disestablished the OSS and, in 1946 created the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), an agency that answered to the President. The CIG was doomed to be a short-lived agency with the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency in the National Security Act of 1947 (NSA). What did the National Security Act of 1947 do? Since 1947, this act of Congress has provided the structure in which US national security policies and strategies have been formulated and executed. Amended a number of times since 1947 to accommodate new policies, oversight strategies and new agencies, the NSA of 1947 has been the backbone to American, and by extension by some means, Allied, to how the Cold War was fought, and the war on terrorism. Now, it is the framework in which our nation is dealing with China and with a resurgent Russian Empire. It also established the National Security Council, a body dedicated to coordinating all the activities of the executive branch regarding national security, 4 and answering to the president. This coordination also includes intelligence activities (analysis, collection, and covert action). Original Members of the Intelligence Community More directly related to our studies, the Act created the Central Intelligence Agency and moreover, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). The DCI was intended to coordinate the various intelligence activities of all intelligence efforts in the executive branch but until recently failed to give the position the budgetary authority in which to do so effectively. The intelligence functions of the three primary military services (Army, Air Force and Navy (US Marine Corps is part of the Dept of the Navy), and the State Department were legislated into the Act as well. Additions to the IC (Amendments to NSA 1947) As the new Dept. of Defense matured and the service agencies realized the need for better intelligence and to adapt new collection technologies, changes and additions to the intelligence community were made. Major agency additions to the US Intelligence Community since the initial Act have been: • National Security Agency—1952 • Defense Intelligence Agency—1961 • National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)—classified existence till 1992 • National Geospatial Agency (NGA)—mid 1990s as the National Imagery & Mapping Agency (NIMA) • US Coast Guard—2001 • Dept of Homeland Security—2004 • Drug Enforcement Agency-2007 • Director of National Intelligence/Office of the Director of National Intelligence-2007 • Space Force–2021 While not an addition to the IC, President Reagan started, in my professional opinion, an important trend in 1981, that is codifying the role of the intelligence community in an executive order—in this case EO 12333 (or read it online in the course reading materials). This executive order, based upon NSA of 1947 (Amended) and other related federal laws, dictates how the IC will operate in pursuit of its national security missions. Only changed once, by President George W. Bush to accommodate changes in NSA of 1947 (Amended), it is one of the most important policy documents impacting the intelligence community. 5 Post 9/11 Developments Public pressure, mostly from the families of those lost in the Twin Towers, caused the President and Congress to convene the bipartisan the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, also known as the 9/11 Commission. 3 The Commission’s Report, also known as the 9/11 Report, made a large number of recommendations including major reforms for the IC. Many of those reforms, including the creation of the Office of Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), were codified into law in December 2004 in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. Check out this US Senate link for a summary of the IRPTA Act of 2004. Summary The national desire to avoid being a victim of a sneak attack like Pearl Harbor and combined with the need to deal with the growing Soviet threat in the late 1940s led to the creation of the US national intelligence community. That desire was reaffirmed post 9/11. Currently its members include: Central Intelligence Agency The primary mission of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is to collect, analyze, evaluate, and disseminate foreign intelligence. This intelligence aids government policy makers in making national security and defense decisions. The CIA does not make policy recommendations. Department of Energy, Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence The Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for United States (U.S.) energy policy and nuclear safety. They provide timely technical intelligence analysis on all aspects of foreign nuclear weapons, nuclear materials and energy issues worldwide. Department of Homeland Security, Intelligence and Analysis The mission of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis is to equip the Homeland Security Enterprise with the intelligence and information it needs to keep the Homeland safe, secure, and resilient. Of note, while not a formal part of the US intelligence community, the National Fusion Center Network at the state, regional and local level continues to grow as a partner to DHS and other federal agencies. Learn more about the state and local fusion centers online here. 3 The northern New Jersey church in which I was married lost 16 men in NYC on 9/11. Those families and other families of the 9/11 victims demanded from their leaders the why it happened. 6 Department of State, Office of Intelligence and Research The Department of State Office of Intelligence and Research (DOS INR) handles intelligence analysis, policy, and coordination of intelligence activities in support of diplomacy. They provide a wide range of intelligence support to the Secretary of State and other policymakers, ambassadors, special negotiators, country directors and desk officers. The DOS INR is the Secretary of State’s principal adviser on all intelligence matters. Department of Treasury, Office of Intelligence and Analysis The Department of Treasury’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DOT) advises policymakers on domestic and international financial, monetary, economic, trade and tax policy. They also provide focused intelligence support to Treasury officials on the full range of economic, political and security issues. One of their more important missions is the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) where economic sanctions are applied domestically and worldwide against formally named terrorists and other national security threats. Defense Intelligence Agency The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is one of four major intelligence agencies that make up the Department of Defense. The DIA produces and manages foreign military intelligence. They provide assessments of foreign military intentions and capabilities to U.S. military commanders and civilian policymakers. The DIA performs five core intelligence functions: human intelligence collection, all-source analysis, counterintelligence, technical intelligence collection, and document and media management. Drug Enforcement Administration The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) is responsible for enforcing federal controlled substances laws and regulations. The DEA shares any drug-related intelligence with the IC that is acquired while executing their drug enforcement duties. Federal Bureau of Investigation The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is an intelligence and law enforcement agency tasked with understanding threats to our national security and penetrating national, as well as transnational, networks that wish to and are capable of harming the U.S. They focus on terrorist organizations, foreign intelligence services, weapons proliferators, and criminal enterprises. National Geospatial Intelligence Agency The National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA) is one of four major intelligence agencies that make up the Department of Defense. The NGA collects and generates information about the Earth, which is used for navigation, national security, U.S. military operations, and humanitarian aid efforts. 7 National Reconnaissance Office The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) is one of four major intelligence agencies that make up the Department of Defense and is staffed by personnel on loan from CIA, the Air Force and other IC agencies and elements. The NRO is our nation’s eyes and ears in space. They design, build, and operate the nation’s signals and imagery reconnaissance satellites. Information from these satellites is used to warn of potential foreign military aggression, monitor weapons programs, enforce arms control and environmental treaties, and assess the impact of natural and manmade disasters. National Security Agency The National Security Agency (NSA) is one of four major intelligence agencies that make up the Department of Defense. They are our nation’s cryptologic organization charged with protecting the government’s information systems and producing foreign signals intelligence information. Their work includes cryptanalysis, cryptography, mathematics, computer science, and foreign language analysis. Office of the Director of National Intelligence The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) was established in 2004 to manage the extensive efforts of the IC. The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) heads up the ODNI and serves as the principal advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council. The DNI also coordinates intelligence matters related to the Department of Defense with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. The ODNI’s focus is to promote a more integrated and collaborative IC. U.S. Air Force, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance The U.S. Air Force intelligence staff conducts surveillance and reconnaissance to provide a tactical advantage to our troops. U.S. Army, Army Military Intelligence Army intelligence staff supplies relevant and timely information, pertaining to ground troops and movements, to Army and other military personnel at all levels. U.S. Coast Guard, Coast Guard Intelligence The Coast Guard is now part of DHS and deals with information relating to maritime security and homeland defense. Their missions include port security, search and rescue, maritime safety, counter-narcotics, and alien migration interdiction. U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Intelligence Activity Marine Corps Intelligence staff is responsible for intelligence, counterintelligence, terrorism, classified information, security review, and cryptologic activities. 8 U.S. Navy, Office of Naval Intelligence Established in 1882, Naval Intelligence is America’s longest continuously operating intelligence service. The mission of Naval Intelligence is to create a decisive, warfighting advantage through accurate and timely warning of enemy capability, location and intent. Naval Intelligence professionals are deployed worldwide with operational Navy forces and Department of Defense elements, as well as at the Office of Naval Intelligence and Navy headquarters in the Pentagon. Space Force, National Space Intelligence Center The U.S. Space Force (USSF) is a new branch of the Armed Forces. It was established on December 20, 2019 with enactment of the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act and stood-up over the following 18 months. The National Space Intelligence Center was officially created at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, OH
Week 4 Lecture Notes
• Chapter 4 Lowenthal
• Chapters 3 & 8 Clark
• Parts I & VII Krizan
• Week 4 Lecture Notes and review the websites embedded in it.
• Chapter 2 Hendrix
Lowenthal, Mark. 2020. Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (9 th Ed.). Washington DC: CQ Press. • Hendrix, M. Patrick, and Major, James S. 2023. Communicating with Intelligence; Writing and Briefing for National Security (3rd Ed.). New York, NY: Rowman & Littlefield. • Clark, Robert M. 2020. Intelligence Analysis; A Target-Centric Approach (7 th Ed.). Washington DC: CQ Press. • Krizan, Lisa. 1999. Intelligence Essentials for Everyone. Washington DC: Defense Intelligence College. (provided on course website)
This week we shall examine the intelligence cycle—an intelligence process. Remember always to use Lowenthal’s models to discern what type of intelligence you are dealing with: 1. An intelligence organization 2. An intelligence process 3. An intelligence product One way to remember these is that an intelligence organization deploys an intelligence process to create an intelligence product. So, what is the predominant intelligence process used globally? It is a process referred by most as the intelligence cycle. Intelligence Cycle–Not a Rigid Definition Here we go again. There is no standard federal or industry definition of the intelligence cycle. Lowenthal (Chapter 4) sets his concept of the cycle as: • Identifying Requirements • Collection of Information • Processing & Exploitation • Analysis & Production • Dissemination • Consumption • Feedback Krizan (Part 1) describes the process as a: “…cyclical process, a series of repeated and interrelated steps that add value to original inputs and create a substantially transformed product.” As you can see in Figure 4-1 below, most of the phases of the intelligence cycle are interdependent and through evaluation of all phases, feedback can be provided during most if not all phases.” 2 For the purposes of this class, the intelligence cycle will be considered to be the following six steps: • Planning & Direction (Requirements Development) • Collection • Processing & Exploitation • Analysis & Production • Dissemination • Consumption & Feedback Of note, since I have been working in the intelligence field, the phase(s) of consumption and feedback are new. In the late 1990s, there was a growing movement in all parts of the federal government to gather feedback from customers. This caused intelligence agencies, for the most part, to systematically collect feedback on their efforts in an attempt to improve service and products. Figure 4-1. DOD Intelligence Cycle. The ODNI describes its version of the cycle in this way (US National Intelligence Community: An Overview 2011, ODNI—See the optional reading material in this week’s folder for a copy.): ”The intelligence cycle is the process of developing raw information into finished intelligence for use by policy makers, military commanders and 3 other consumers in decision-making. This six-step cyclical process is highly dynamic, continuous, and never-ending. The sixth step, evaluation (which includes soliciting feedback from users) is conducted for each of the other five steps individually and for the cycle as a whole.” Sounds much like Krizan’s definition, doesn’t it? Let’s take a look at each phase: • Planning & Direction (Requirements): This is a crucial phase as consumers state their needs (requirements), and in turn the intelligence community plans and directs use of its resources to meet those needs. Intelligence requirements in the military are also known as “essential elements of information” (EEIs). The term “key intelligence questions” (KIQs) can also be used as well. We will look a bit deeper at EEIs next week when we learn about the intelligence consumer. • Collection: If the IC lacks the necessary information to analyze to satisfy a consumer’s requirements, then it will determine how to collect more information to feed into the intelligence cycle. One intelligence collection discipline or a set of them (depending on the challenges of collecting against a target) will be applied against the intelligence “gap.” Collection disciplines or “ints” are grouped into five major types: o HUMINT (human intelligence) o IMINT/GEOINT (imagery or geographic intelligence) o SIGINT (signals intelligence) o OSINT (open source intelligence) o MASINT (measurements & signatures intelligence) We will delve deeper into the collection disciplines during Week Six. • Processing & Exploitation: Much of the information gathered during the collection phase is considered to be “raw, unevaluated information” that requires processing (translation, decryption/decoding, databasing, etc.) before analysis can start. Over the past 20 years, the advances in information technology have radically decreased the time needed for processing. But still much collected information goes unprocessed or unexploited. It will be interesting to see how the IC harnesses the potential of artificial intelligence and machine learning to reduce the amount of unprocessed data over the next few years. • Analysis & Production: Once the collected information is put into a format available, or more important, useful for analysis, then the analysis and production phase will start. This phase’s goal is to produce finished intelligence to support policy and decision-makers and other consumers. 4 Analysis requires the integration of data and placing of evaluated information into proper context. Typically, this phase creates intelligence in one or more of the following categories (by use): o current intelligence; o estimative intelligence; o warning intelligence; o science & technical intelligence; o operational intelligence; and o research intelligence. A deeper exploration of these types of intelligence products will be conducted during Week Seven. 1 • Dissemination: Another key phase in which the intelligence product is delivered to consumers in any format they request (oral briefing, written assessment, database, annotated imagery, GIS, etc.). There are multiple channels for intelligence to disseminated and will be further discussed during Week Five. • Consumption & Feedback: For intelligence to be useful, it needs to be consumed, and based upon that consumption, feedback on its utility can be formed and provided back to the producer. As you can imagine, receiving feedback from your consumer is vitally important in improving your performance. Unfortunately, you cannot force consumption of intelligence, if a customer does not use it, that decision is out of your hands. Intelligence Cycle—Not a Perfect Process Former Boston University professor and National Intelligence Officer (NIO) Art Hulnick stated, “It is not really a very good descriiption of the ways in which the intelligence process works. Additionally, it ignores two main parts of the intelligence work, counterintelligence and covert action.” We’ll look into those two topics later in the class during weeks dedicated to each of them. 1 Warning—this is the first mention of “intelligence products.” Remember the Lowenthal model of PPO (process, product, organization). “In this ‘intelligence cycle,’ much can go wrong…” Loch Johnson 5 While the intelligence cycle is not a perfect process, you should understand how the phases work with each other and depend on each other for the entire process to be successful. And when it is not, the price can be very high (Iraqi WMD, 9/11, 1968 Tet Offensive, 1973 Yon Kippur War, Pearl Harbor intelligence failures, etc.). Like many other process models, it provides you a starting point in which to examine the intelligence process. Intelligence Cycle in the Business World The Strategic and Competitive Professionals (SCIP) states that there is a competitive intelligence cycle that contains five stages, including: • planning and direction, • published information collection, • primary source collection, • analysis and production, and • report and inform. Much like government intelligence, this model also proposes that feedback should be utilized to improve future intelligence planning and that intelligence requirements are generated by end user needs. Learn more about competitive or business intelligence here online